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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-3291 
________________ 
 
ROBERT KING RODRIGUEZ,  
 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
        Respondent 
 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Steven A. Morley 
(No. A076-546-314) 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 12, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
and RESTANI,
*
 Judge 
 
(Opinion filed: June 20, 2014) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION   
________________ 
 
                                              
*
 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by 
designation. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Robert King Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) petitions for review of the decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) upholding the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) 
denial of Rodriguez’s application for cancellation of removal.  For the reasons that 
follow, we dismiss the petition.   
I. 
Rodriguez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States in the 
early 1990s.  In 2000, the Government issued a notice to appear charging him as 
removable subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United States 
without being admitted or paroled.  Rodriguez did not receive the notice to appear, 
however, and failed to appear at his hearing.  The IJ therefore entered an order of removal 
in absentia against Rodriguez.  In 2008, after Rodriguez learned of the order of removal, 
he filed a counseled motion to reopen proceedings, which was granted.  Thereafter, 
Rodriguez conceded his removability as charged but sought cancellation of removal 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  In support of his request for cancellation of removal, 
he claimed that his removal would be detrimental to the health of his United States 
citizen wife, Evelyn Perez (“Perez”), and to the economic situation of his two United 
States-citizen children.   
In an oral decision, the IJ noted that he found Rodriguez to be credible.  The IJ 
then discussed Rodriguez’s claim that his wife, who suffers from hypertension, would 
face an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon Rodriguez’s removal to the 
Dominican Republic.  After reviewing the evidence, including Perez’s medical records 
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and prescriptions,  the IJ found that there was “no evidentiary record to support the need 
for medicine.”  App. 15.  Additionally, based in part on his review of reports on the 
availability of prescription medications in the Dominican Republic, the IJ concluded that 
there was not “sufficient medical evidence to demonstrate that Ms. Perez will suffer 
medically in any meaningful way” if she went with Rodriguez to the Dominican 
Republic.  Id. at 20.  The IJ then addressed Rodriguez’s claim that his family would 
suffer economically if he was removed.  Citing Matter of Pilch, 21 I. & N. Dec. 627 (BIA 
1996), a case involving suspension of deportation under now-repealed 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) 
(1994), the IJ concluded that “changes in opportunity and economic downturn are simply 
not sufficient . . . to warrant a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to 
Rodriguez’s family.  Id. at 17.  The IJ therefore denied Rodriguez’s request for 
cancellation of removal and ordered his removal to the Dominican Republic.  
Rodriguez appealed to the Board.  The Board noted that the “exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship” standard is stricter than the “extreme hardship” standard 
employed under prior law in Pilch, and that, accordingly, “the fact that [Rodriguez’s] 
case is distinguishable and involves greater hardship does not necessarily mean that the 
respondent has met his burden of showing that his qualifying relatives will experience the 
hardship required to qualify for cancellation of removal . . . .”  Id. at 4.  The Board then 
determined there was no clear error in the IJ’s finding that Rodriguez failed to present 
sufficient evidence that his wife required certain medications and would suffer adverse 
medical consequences without them, and noted that “without additional medical evidence 
[of Perez’s condition], the availability or lack of availability of medication for the 
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respondent’s wife is not a factor in the hardship determination.”  Id.  The Board further 
ruled that Rodriguez had not offered sufficient evidence regarding his children and the 
educational opportunities in the Dominican Republic to establish that they would suffer 
an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon his removal.  For those reasons, the 
Board upheld the IJ’s order.  Rodriguez, through counsel, filed a timely petition for 
review. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  While our review extends only to the 
Board’s order of removal, we may review the decision of the IJ to the extent that the 
Board’s order expressly adopts or defers to a finding of the IJ.  Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 
F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).   
Rodriguez challenges the Board’s conclusion that he did not show sufficient 
hardship to his wife and children.  We lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial 
of cancellation of removal, including the Agency’s determination under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) that a petitioner did not show sufficient hardship.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2010).  We retain 
jurisdiction, however, to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Patel, 619 F.3d at 232.  “To determine whether a claim is 
colorable, we ask whether it is immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining 
jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 
186 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, Rodriguez 
purports to raise both due process claims and questions of law.   
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Rodriguez first argues that the Board denied due process by failing to review the 
entirety of the evidence submitted, including records of Perez’s visits to the doctor, a note 
from Perez’s doctor, and Perez’s pharmacy records.  Due process requires that an alien’s 
removal proceedings afford him “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful manner.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  This includes the right to “factfinding based on a 
record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him,” the right “to make 
arguments on his . . . own behalf,” and “the right to an individualized determination of his 
. . . interests.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, the Board found 
no clear error in the IJ’s finding that the record evidence did not establish Perez’s need 
for certain medications.  The Board then noted that, in light of the fact that Rodriguez 
failed to establish Perez’s need for medication, the availability or lack of availability of 
medication for Perez was not a factor in the hardship determination.  Contrary to what 
Rodriguez argues in his brief, the Board’s conclusion was within the constraints of clear 
error review, and did not constitute additional fact-finding or the application of an 
erroneous legal standard.  Moreover, the Board’s characterization of the IJ’s conclusions 
was consistent with the IJ’s oral decision, and the Board did not, as Rodriguez claims, 
attribute to the IJ a conclusion that he did not make.  Rodriguez has thus not made a 
colorable showing that the Board failed to make an individualized determination of his 
interests or otherwise violated his due process rights.   
Rodriguez further argues that the Board exceeded its regulatory authority and 
“applied an inappropriate and unattainably high standard of law” when reviewing his 
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cancellation claim.  Appellant’s Br. at 17.  However, the Board exercised clear error 
review over the IJ’s findings of fact and upheld the IJ’s determination that Rodriguez did 
not establish an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United States-citizen 
family members.  Thus we believe that while Rodriguez purports to raise a question of 
law, he is actually asserting that he met his burden of showing an exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship.  We lack jurisdiction to review such a claim.  See Patel, 619 
F.3d at 233. 
 Because none of Rodriguez’s claims present a colorable constitutional claim or 
question of law, we must dismiss his petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel, 619 F.3d at 232. 
 
